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1994]
FURTHERING THE GOALS OF CERCLA BY LIMITING STATE
AGENCY CLEANUP LIABILITY: STILLOE V ALMY
BROTHERS, INC.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Stilloe v. Almy Brothers, Inc. ("Stilloe if"),' the District Court
for the Northern District of New York confronted the issue of
whether a state agency could be considered an "operator" under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), when its only connection to a hazardous
waste site resulted from its remedial clean-up efforts. 2 Stilloe if provides an example of how courts are furthering the goals of CERCLA
3
to limit taxpayer liability for cleanups.
By enacting CERCLA, Congress sought to facilitate the expeditious cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that the ultimate financial burden would be placed on those responsible for the
waste. Courts have struggled in reconciling these two goals where a
state agency, responding to an emergency, causes additional environmental damage. The Stilloe II decision has struck a balance in
favor of addressing the primary goal of cleaning up the environment, then ascertaining to whom and to what extent responsible
parties may be liable. 4 The district court recognized the need to
limit state agency liability to accomplish the aforementioned goals. 5
In Stilloe If, the court held that a state agency was not considered an operator under CERC[A for releases that were caused by
the agency's efforts to remediate a contaminated site. 6 The court
held that the agency lacked a sufficient nexus to the site because
the New York Department of Environmental Conservation's
1. 782 F. Supp. 731 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) [hereinafter Stilloe fl].
2. Comprehensive Environmental Reslonse, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA) §§ 101-308, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
3. For a discussion of CERCLA's goals, see infra notes 28-29 and accompany-

ing text.
4. For a discussion of the Stilloe !/holding, see infranotes 8-9 and accompanying text.
5. Stilloe 1, 782 F. Supp. 731.
6. For discussion of basis for Mr. Stilloe's action against the New York Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC"), see infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.

(549)
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("DEC") only connection to the site resulted from its remedial
7
clean-up efforts.
This Note analyzes the district court's interpretation of the degree of involvement required to pronounce a state agency liable as
an "operator" under CERCLA. As this Note will demonstrate, the
Stilloe 1 court recognized the demand for drawing a distinction between activity indicative of an "operator" and activity undertaken by
states in response to an emergency.8 Stilloe 11 moves the courts toward clarifying states' potential CERCLA liability under section 107.
II.

FACTS

Mr. Stilloe, a property owner, brought an action against the
DEC 9 contending that during efforts to remove barrels containing
hazardous substances, 10 the DEC and its agents were grossly negli7. Stilloe II, 782 F. Supp. at 736. See also CERCLA § 107(d) (2), 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(d) (2).

As emphasized in the Stiloe H opinion:
An individual may only be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (3) when the
plaintiff can demonstrate some type of nexus between the allegedly responsible person and the owner of the hazardous substances. When the
only connection between the entity allegedly responsible for the damage
and the hazardous waste itself is the fact that the party in question was
attempting to remediate the hazardous waste problems at the site, liability
under this portion of the Act does not exist.
Stilloe v. Almy Brothers, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 95, 99 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter
Stilloe 1] (citing State of New York v. City of Johnstown, 701 F. Supp. 33, 36
(N.D.N.Y. 1988).
The district court also held that the DEC's motion for reconsideration was
made within a reasonable time pursuant to Federal Rule 60(b), even though the
motion was not made within a ten-day period required by local federal rule. Stiloe
, 782 F. Supp. at 732-33. The motion for reconsideration was granted in order to
prevent manifest injustice based upon intervening change of controlling law. Id. at
733. The court further held that DEC was not liable for contribution under
CERCLA.
8. For CERCLA § 107(d) (2) statutory language, see infra note 52.
9. DEC is a New York State agency "whose purpose is to coordinate and develop policies, planning and programming related to the environment of the
state." Stilloe I, 759 F. Supp. at 99 (quoting N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw, Art. 3).
10. CERCLA § 101(14) defines "hazardous substance" as
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321 (b) (2) (A) of Title
33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001
of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A § 6921] . . . (D) any toxic
pollutant listed under section 1317 (a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air
pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.
§ 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to
section 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include petroleum, including
crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed
or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A)
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gent in allowing one or more barrels to break open, allegedly causing hazardous waste contamination."
In 1988, DEC determined that certain barrels containing hazardous substances were being stored without proper authorization
on property Mr. Stilloe planned to purchase. 12 It was averred that
the barrels were placed in an area next to the building in which Mr.
Stilloe conducted his business.' 3 After DEC's determination, Mr.
Stilloe purchased the property. 14 Mr. Stilloe alleged, however, that
before he purchased the property the previous property owner had
moved barrels and debris stored at the site onto another property,
the Almy property, which bordered the site and is accessed by a
common driveway. I5
In 1989, DEC concluded that the site posed a threat to the
environment and needed immediate cleanup. 16 Thereafter, DEC
assumed management of the site and moved the barrels from the
Almy property to a point further back on a common driveway
17
shared by Stilloe and Almy.
In response to DEC's action, Stilloe claimed that, in fact, DEC
had conducted a preliminary cleanup of the spilled waste and contaminated soil and placed the hazardous substances in new barrels
stored on the Stilloe and Almy properties.' 8 Stilloe alleged that
DEC was therefore liable as an "operator" under CERCLA section
107(d) for releases of hazardous substances found to be the result
of "intentional or grossly negligent misconduct" 19 during a DEC rethrough (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas,
natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel
(or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).

CERCLA § 10(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).

11. Stilloe I, 759 F. Supp. at 95. Mr. Stilloe also asserted claims against Mr.
McMahon, the previous property owner, who allegedly moved barrels being stored
at the site onto neighboring property and against Almy Brothers, Inc. ("Almy"), a
neighboring property owner. Id. at 97.
12. Stilloe 1, 759 F. Supp. at 97.
13. Id.
14. Id.

15. Id. Both Mr. McMahon and Almy Brothers were defendants in this action.
Id.

16. The DEC designated the site as a Class 2 site under Art. 27, Title 13 of the
New York Environmental Conservation Law. See N.Y. ENVrL CONSERV. LAw §§ 271301 - §§ 27-1321 (McKinney 1984). "With this classification, the DEC determined
that the site in question posed a significant threat to the environment which required immediate action." Stilloe 1, 759 F. Supp at 97 (footnote omitted).
17. Id.
18. Stilloe 1, 759 F. Supp. at 98.

19. See CERCLA § 107(d) (2), 42 U.S.C § 9607 (d) (2). Stilloe asserted three

causes of action in an amended complaint. Stilloe 1, 759 F. Supp. at 98. In the first
claim, he sought response costs under CERCLA against all defendants. I& The
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sponse to environmental hazards at the Stilloe/Almy Brothers
property.2 0 The district court agreed that DEC qualified as an "op2
erator" for purposes of CERCLA liability. '
In 1992, DEC sought reconsideration or, in the alternative, certification of the court's 1991 order denying DEC's motion to dismiss claims and counter-claims against it for hazardous waste cleanup activity.22 The court order denied DEC's motion on the
grounds that DEC may be liable as an "operator" within the mean23
ing of CERCLA.

second claim was against McMahon, the previous property owner, for breach of
contract. Id. The third claim was directed at all defendants for a declaratory
judgement from the Northern District Court of New York, pursuant the CERCLA
§ 113(g) (2) and § 107. Id. Stilloe sought a "declaration from this court finding
the defendants liable to Stilloe for all those response costs incurred by him in the
future which are necessary and consistent with the national contingency plan developed to remediate the site at issue." Id.
20. Stilloe II, 782 F. Supp. at 732.
21. Stilloe, 759 F. Supp. at 106. See CERCLA § 101 (21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
In addition to holding that DEC qualified as "a "person" under CERCIA the
district court also held that "an entity may only be liable under a CERCLA provision if the entity arranges for disposal, treatment, or transport of hazardous substances, and ifplaintiff can demonstrate some type of nexus between allegedly responsible
person and owner of hazardous substances." Id. at 103-04 (emphasis added). See CERCIA § 107(a) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (3) (holding transporters of hazardous waste
liable for cleanup costs). Furthermore, the court stated that liability does not arise
under CERCLA when the only connection between person allegedly responsible
for damage and hazardous waste itself is the fact that the party in question was
attempting to remediate hazardous waste problems at site. 759 F. Supp. at 103-04
(citing CERCLA § 107(a) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (3)).
The court found that DEC qualified as an "operator" at the time it allegedly
broke open barrels containing hazardous waste while moving them for purposes of
CERCLA cleanup, despite the determination that it was responding to an emergency and was acting in response to immediate threats to the public health and
environment. Stilloe I,759 F. Supp. at 103-04. See CERCIA § 107(a) (1), (2), 42
U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (1), (2). The court stated that DEC would not be shielded from
liability for its actions concerning the hazardous waste site if the leakage that occurred during the cleanup of the property was found to have been the result of
intentional or grossly negligent conduct on part of the Department. 759 F. Supp.
at 103-04. See CERCLA § 107(d) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d) (2).
In Stilloe I, the court limited DEC's liability to those actions which were "found
to have been the result of either intentional or grossly negligent conduct... since
its actions were in response to an emergency situation which existed at the site."
Stilloe I, 759 F. Supp. at 104 n.8.
22. Stilloe 1I,
782 F. Supp. at 732-33. The certification sought was pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
23. 782 F. Supp. at 732.
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BACKGROUND

A. CERCLA
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.24 CERCLA was established "to provide a federal mechanism for expeditiously cleaning
up" hazardous waste sites. 25 CERCLA's goal is to provide financing
for both governmental and private responses, and place the ulti26
mate financial burden upon those responsible for the waste.
A defendant is liable under CERCLA section 107(a) when (1)
there is a facility, 27 (2) from which a release 28 or threatened release

of any hazardous substance 29 has occurred, (3) causing the plaintiff
to incur response costs, 30 and (4) the defendant falls within one of
32
the four classes of "persons"3 1 subject to CERCLA liability.
24. CERCLA § 101-308, 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675.
25. Lawrence P. Schnapf, EnvironmentalLiability: Law & Strategyfor Businesses
and Corporations,§ 5.01, at 5-1 Issue 2 (1992).
26. Julie Mendel, Interpreting "Owner" and "Operator"Liability Under CERCLA:
Edward Hines Lumber Company v. Vulcan Materials Company, 861 F2d 155 (7th Cir.
1988), 38 WASH. U.J. UR3. & CONTEMP. L. 229, 233 (1990).
One commentator has noted that:
[t]he federal courts are required to efficiently interpret the statutory provisions found in CERCLA in such a way as to compel those deemed responsible for hazardous waste facilities to disgorge the necessary funds for
their cleanup. Recent decisions by the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts have established a trend toward expanding the definition of
"owner and operator," in the absence of Congressional provisions limiting the scope of liability under the Act, for the purpose of generating
funds for cleanup.
John P. Dragani, Comment, ApportioningLiabilityfor the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste
Sites Under the Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 1 ViLu. Ev-r.L. L. 537, 543-44 (1990).
27. "Facility" is defined under CERCLA as
"(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline
(including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works),
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container,
motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed,
or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer
product in consumer use or any vessel[.]
CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
28. CERCLA § 101 (22) defines "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping,
or disposing into the environment...." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
29. For the CERCLA definition of "hazardous substance," see supra note 10.
30. "Respond" or "response" means "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial
action." CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
31. For an explanation of the types of persons subject to CERCLA liability, see
infra note 33.
32. Kim E. Williamson & Thomas W. McCann, After Union Gas 1: The State as
an "Operator" Under CERCLA, 23 A~iz. ST. LJ. 409 n. (1991)(citing CERCLA
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The four classes of persons recognized in CERCLA section 107
include: (1) current owners or operators of the hazardous substance facility, (2) owners or operators of the facility at the time of
disposal, (3) persons who arranged for treatment or disposal of hazardous substances at the facility and (4) persons who transported
33
hazardous substances for treatment and disposal at the facility.
The scope of this Note encompasses only the courts' struggle with
proper classification of a state agency as an "operator."3 4 Difficulty
arises when attempting to ascertain the circumstances that would
lead a state agency to be classified as an "operator." CERCLA defines an "owner or operator" as the following:
(i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating,
or chartering by demise, such vessel,
(ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, 'any person owning or operating such facility,
and
(iii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was
conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delin§ 107(a) (1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1)-(4)). For statutory language of section
107(a), see infra note 33.
33. CERCLA section 107(a) imposes liability on four groups of persons:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of
a hazardous substance, shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent
with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried
out under section 9604(i) of this title.
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
34. For statutory definition of "operator," see text accompanying infra note
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quency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of
state or local government, any person who owned,
operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand. Such term does not
include a person, who without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in
3
the vessel or facility.

5

Of the four categories of potentially responsible parties
("PRPs") identified in section 107,36 "operator" creates the most
ambiguity.3 7 The question of who Congress intended to qualify as

an "operator" under CERCLA has required judicial clarification. 38
The majority of courts agree that CERCLA's definition of "operator" sheds little light on how liability is determined.3 9 The courts'
interpretations of the "operator" definition, however, have been of
little help. The courts have failed to identify at what point the involvement or control becomes so pervasive as to warrant the imposition of CERCLA liability.40 Further, the CERCLA section 101 (20)
definition of "operator" incorporates exceptions as to who may
qualify as an "operator."41 The legislature's explanation in section
101 (20), however, does not make it apparent who is included.
35. CERCLA § 101 (20) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A).
36. For the four categories of PRPs, see text accompanying supra note 34.
37. It has been said that "[p]erhaps the least understood category of liability
under [CERCLA] is that of 'operator' liability." See Williamson & McCann, supra
note 32, at 409 (footnotes omitted).
38. Furthermore, "[tihere is little 'operator' legislative histoy and that which
does exist, again, is circular: An operator is a person carrying out operational functions for the owner of the facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement." Williamson & McCann, supra note 32, at 412 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
39. See Olsen, supra note 27, at 190 (footnote omitted).
40. See infra notes 57-82 and accompanying text. For a discussion of cases
finding that a government entity was or could be liable as an operator under CERCLA, see Williamson & McCann, supra note 32, at 419-437.
41. CERCLA § 101(20)(D) states that:
[T]he term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State or local
government which acquired ownership or control involuntarily through
bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in
which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its function
as sovereign. The exclusion provided under this paragraph shall not apply to any State or local government which has caused or contributed to
the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility, and such a state or local government shall be subject to the provisions
of this Act in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally
and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability
under section 107.
CERCLA § 101 (20) (D), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20) (D).
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Despite the ambiguity surrounding CEROLA, the question of
who may qualify as an "operator" ultimately becomes an issue of
control. Generally, "an operator is one who exercised control over
the activities at a facility that's caused or contributed to the release
of hazardous substances." 4 2 A distinction may be warranted when
the entity involved is the state or a state agency.43 However,
although there may be considerations unique to states, the control
analysis applied to a state is identical to that applied to nongovernmental PRPs.44 More specifically, courts examine whether the state
has exercised control over employment decisions, finances, and especially the disposal and treatment of hazardous substances, as indicators of liability.4 5 State agencies and local governments are
increasingly involved in federal hazardous waste law by virtue of
42. Williamson & McCann, supra note 32, at 409. One commentator has
noted that:
[T]he courts have focused on the degree of control exercised by a party
for purposes of deciding operator liability. For example, in Edward
Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988),
the court did not hold a company liable a company that designed a manufacturing facility and trained its workers, concluding that the company
did not exercise sufficient control over the manufacturing facility's
operations.
Theodore L. Garrett, Supeifund Liability Defenses: A 1992 Primer,6 NAT. RESOURcES
& ENV'T 3, 4 (1992). See also United States v. Stringfellow, 31 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1315, 1320 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that California was liable as operator
of site when state selected site and controlled dumping at site).
Another commentator has noted that "[t]he majority of courts continue to
look for evidence of the PRP's actual control over management decisions concerning hiring and supervision of employees and the disposal and treatment of waste as
primary indicators of active operation or participation." Olsen, supra note 27, at
193 (footnote omitted).
43. SeeWilliamson & McCann, supra note 32, at 410. These two authors have
conveyed the idea that:
The problem of determining whether a participating entity is an operator
is compounded when that other entity is the state. Very few courts have
faced the question of when, and whether a state may be liable as an operator under CERCLA, and those that have addressed the issue have
reached differing conclusions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Considerations may be different when a state or state agency is involved because their interests are distinctive from those of a corporation or private entity.
States are afforded an exemption from liability when they are responding to an
emergency. See CERCLA § 107(d) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (d) (2).
44. Two commentators have discussed what appears to be some reluctance by
courts to apply this same definition when evaluating potential operator liability for
a state or governmental entity. "Although Congress gave no hint that different
principles of operator liability should apply to states as opposed to private parties,
courts have struggled (unnecessarily) to define a new and separate definition of
state operator liability." Williamson & McCann, supra note 32, at 418-19.
45. Id.
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their "owning or operating" facilities that receive hazardous waste.4 6
Under CERCLA section 107, states who are "owners or operators"
of a landfill that releases hazardous substances are considered "persons" subject to liability for clean-up costs and natural resource
damage. 4 7 Accordingly, state entities like DEC fall within CER8
CLA's liability scheme.4

46. Eugene Berman &Jeffrey H. Howard, How Should FederalHazardous Waste
Policy Address Potentially Responsible Local Governments?, 19 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) No.
11, July 15, 1988, at 373. Cf United States v. Dart Indus., 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir.
1988) (holding that state agency was not "owner or operator" of hazardous waste
site within meaning of Act).
47. See Berman & Howard, supra note 47, at 373. CERCLA § 101(21) defines
.person" as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership,
consortium,
joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(21).
One commentator has emphasized that:
States were not originally subject to section 107(a) liability because the
Eleventh Amendment's guarantee of sovereign immunity acted as a constitutional bar to such liability. After SARA was enacted in 1986 however,
many courts recognized that the plain language of these amendments
clearly expressed Congressional intent to abrogate this sovereign immunity defense.
Olsen, supra note 27, at 188. See, e.g. United States v. Carolawn Inc., 698 F. Supp.
616, 620 (D.S.C. 1987), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Dart Indus. Inc., 847 F.2d
144 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Congress made it clear that states and state agencies could be
liable under CERCLA and SARA..."); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 654
F. Supp. 955, 959 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
Other authors have suggested that "[m] ost cases analyzing state operator liability have focused on whether the state's actions were 'regulatory' in nature. While
pure regulatory conduct typically should not give rise to CERCLA liability... the
proper analysis ... centers on the state's specific acts of control .... " Williamson
& McCann, supra note 32, at 410 (footnote omitted).
In Pennsylvaniav. Union Gas Co., the Supreme Court of the United States was
asked to decide whether a state which contributed to the release of hazardous
substances into the local environment could be held liable in a private action for
its proportionate share of the clean-up costs. 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989). The state was
held liable under § 107(a) as an "owner or operator" since the Supreme Court
ruled that CERCLA is to be construed to include the state if its activities meet the
criteria for operator control. Id. at 1.
48. See Berman & Howard, supranote 47, at 373. It it important to note that
the imposition of CERCLA liability does not violate the sovereign immunity of
states under the 11th amendment. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1. In New York v. City
ofJohnstown, N.Y., 701 F. Supp. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), the court held that the State
was not a "person" subject to contribution under CERCLA where there was no
nexus. Id. at 36-38. The court also held that by bringing a CERCLA lawsuit, the
state waived its sovereign immunity to state-law based compulsory counterclaims
against it. Id.
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Defenses Under CERCLA

Defendants in a CERCLA liability suit, including state agencies,
may assert several defenses to liability claims. 49 In order to support
a claim against liability, a PRP must prove that one of the three
affirmative defenses available under section 107(b) applies to that
PRP.5 0 CERCLA section 107(b) provides that a person shall not be
liable as an operator if it can be established by a preponderance of
the evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous
substance and the resultant damages were caused solely by (1) an
act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) or an act or omission of a third
party other than an employee or agent of the defendant or one
whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant; (4) or
any combination of the foregoing three defenses. 5 1
Invoking a section 107(b) defense, however, is not the only way
to escape liability. Emergency situations may arise that warrant immediate attention. For example, section 107(d) exempts states
from liability for actions taken in response to an emergency created
from a release or threatened release unless the damages are the
49. Although a CERCLA defendant is responsible for cleanup costs, he may
"bring suit against any other responsible parties to recover their pro-rated share of
this liability." Dragani, supra note 30, at 543 (footnote omitted).
50. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). If a defendant cannot prove the
availability of a defense, "he will be forced to take responsibility for the cleanup of
a hazardous waste site." Dragani, supranote 22, at 542-43 (footnote omitted).
51. Specifically, CERCLA section 107(b) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and
the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by (1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent
of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly,
with the defendant (except where the sole contractual arrangement
arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance
of the evidence that
(a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such
hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and
(b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any
such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably
result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.

CERCLA § 107(b).42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
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result of gross negligence. 5 2 Other defendants have argued that
their activities were merely regulatory and were, therefore, immune
53
from liability.
In the event that the above defenses are unsuccessful, however,
section 113 offers assistance by permitting contribution from other
liable parties.5 4 Thus, a liable CERCLA defendant may institute an
action to recover a percentage of the clean-up costs from other responsible parties for the conditions at a particular waste site. 55
C. Judicial Application of CERCLA to State Clean-up Activity
Courts have found state agencies to be liable as operators.
However, the extent to which an agency must become involved
before being labeled as an "operator" is difficult to determine. 56
57
Only a few courts have confronted this issue.
In CPCInternational,Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp.,58 the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR7) became aware of the
52. CERCLA § 107(d) (2) provides:
No State or local government shall be liable under this subchapter for
costs or damages as a result of actions taken in response to an emergency
created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance
generated by or from a facility owned by another person. This paragraph
shall not preclude liability for costs or damages as a result of gross negligence or intentional misconduct by the State or local government. For
the purposes of the preceding sentence, reckless, willful, or wanton misconduct shall constitute gross negligence.
CERCLA § 107(d) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d) (2).
53. See, e.g., CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783 (W.D.
Mich. 1989).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1). CERCLA section 113(0(1) provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following
any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a)
of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court
determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish
the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence
of a civil action under section 9606 or section 9607 of this title.
Id.
55. See Dragani, supra note 26, at 543.
56. See Williamson & McCann, supra note 32, at 410.
57. For discussion on "control," see supra notes 42-45.
58. 731 F. Supp. 783 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
CPC brought an action under CERCLA seeking to recover its response
costs (estimated at $4.5 million). CPC sued Cordova/California, AerojetGeneral, and MDNR. CPC alleged that MDNR's activities at the site qualified it as an "operator" under CERCLA. CPC also alleged that its agreement with Cordova/California involving the disposal of phosgene and
the operation of the purge wells subjected MDNR to liability under the
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existence of contamination on a site, which included purge wells.5 9
The MDNR requested and received funds from the Michigan Legislature to operate the purge wells and to provide an alternate water
supply for local residents. 60 MDNR failed, however, to operate the
wells or to spend the majority of the funds for the alternative water
supply.6 1 Finally, MDNR complied, but only after the court required it to do so under a stipulation of settlement entered by the
court.62 MDNR's failure to operate the purge wells caused an in-

crease in the contamination of local groundwater. 63 Furthermore,
MDNR knew of the contamination yet still failed to fulfill its responsibility and operate the purge wells.64
In order to avoid classification as an operator, MDNR argued
that its role was merely regulatory. 65 The court found, however,
66
that MDNR's association was not merely regulatory in nature.
Since MDNR was actively involved in removing waste from the site
and operating the purge wells, 67 it qualified as an operator under
68

CERCLA.
In United States v. Azrae46 9 a case factually similar to Stilioe II, the
State of Maryland requested the assistance of the Environmental
CERCLA section relating to persons who arrange for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at a site.
MDNR moved pursuant to rule 12(b) (6) of the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure to dismiss the complaint against it for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
Williamson & McCann, supra note 32, at 424 (footnotes omitted).
59. Aerjet, 731 F. Supp. at 786.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing Gollach v. CPCInt'l Inc., No. G77-232 (W.D. Mich. 1981)).
63. Aeroje 731 F. Supp. at 786.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 788 (citing United States v. Dart Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 144, 146
(4th Cir. 1988). In Dart Indus., the court of appeals held that the agency was not
an owner or operator within the meaning of CERCLA. Id. The Aerojet court noted
that the "most commonly adopted yardstick for determining whether a party is an
owner-operator under CERCLA is the degree of control that party is able to exert
over the activity causing the pollution." 731 F. Supp. at 788.
67. Aerojet, 731 F. Supp. at 791-92.
68. Id. See supra text accompanying note 40. In Aerojet the court explained
that "where a party assumes control of an activity and then fails to perform, that
party should bear the responsibility for any pollution which results[." Stilloe I, 759
F. Supp. at 103 (citing Aerjet, 731 F. Supp. at 788) (emphasis omitted).
69. 765 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Md. 1991). The factual circumstances in Azraelare
very similar to those in Stilloe II. In Azrae, both the United States and the State of
Maryland became involved in a clean up effort to persuade the owners to clean up
the site; that effort failed. Id. at 734 (citing Azrae 765 F. Supp. at 1241). The
United States and Maryland brought an action pursuant to CERCLA against the
owners to recover costs incurred in cleaning up the site. 782 F. Supp. at 733 (cit-
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Protection Agency ("EPA") in securing the cleanup of a site. 70
Thereafter, EPA conducted response actions at the site pursuant to
its clean-up authority under CERCLA. 71 Maryland entered into a
State Superfund Contract. 72 Maryland and United States then
brought an action to recover clean-up costs under CERCLA. 73 The
defendants filed counter-claims for contribution. On a motion to
dismiss the counter-claims, the court addressed the issue of
"whether Congress intended the Government and states to be potentially liable under Section 107(a) of CERCLA when EPA and the
states carry out their statutory responsibilities under CERCLA and
state law to clean up hazardous waste sites."7 4 In granting the motion to dismiss, the District Court held that the United States and
Maryland were immune from claims based on activities of the contractors they hired to clean up the site. 75
In United States v. Western ProcessingCo., Inc.,7 6 RSR Corporation
sought contribution from EPA alleging that EPA acted recklessly,
willfully, and negligently at the time it closed the site, undertook to
stabilize it, and conducted the preliminary clean up, therefore causing significant contamination of the Western Processing site. 77 In
Western Processing, the district court articulated Congress's intent
that:
ing Azrae4 765 F. Supp. at 1241.) In response to counter-claims asserted by the
defendants, both the United States and Maryland moved to dismiss on grounds
that the counter-claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Stilloe
I, 782 F. Supp. at 733 (citing Azra=4 765 F. Supp. at 1242). Likewise in Stilloe II, the
DEC alleged that the counter-claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Stilloe 1, 782 F. Supp. at 734.
The Azrael court held that the United States and Maryland were immune
from claims for contribution based on activities of contractors which they hired to
clean up the site. Azrael 765 F. Supp. at 1246.
70. Id. at 1241.
71. Id.
72. Id. The State Superfund Contract was entered into pursuant to section
104 of CERCLA under which the EPA and the State agreed to jointly fund
remediation of the site. Id. (footnote omitted).
73. Azrae 765 F. Supp. at 1239.
74. Stilloe I, 782 F. Supp. at 734 (quoting Azrael 765 F. Supp. at 1243).
75. Azrael 765 F. Supp. at 1243-44.
76. 761 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (dismissing a CERCLA counter-claim
based on the Environmental Protection Agency's clean-up activities). Although
the Western Processingdecisionwas not binding on the Stilloe /I court, its reasoning is
persuasive.
77. Id. at 727. The Stilloe 1 court relied on Western Processing for the same
reasons they relied on AzraeL Stilloe II, 782 F. Supp. at 735. "Although Western
Processinginvolved the EPA, rather than a state environmental agency, its reasoning
is applicable to the present case." Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994

13

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 10

562

VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V: p. 549

[F] irst, those who benefit financially from a commercial activity must internalize the health and environmental costs
as costs of doing business; second, liability is strict, subject
only to specific, enumerated defenses; and third, Congress
specifically considered and rejected an amendment proposed by Senator Helms that would have added government misconduct and negligence as a separate defense to
78
CERCLA liability.
The court thus held that EPA was not acting in the capacity of
owner or operator as it performed its regulatory functions, such a
79
result would contradict the statutory scheme of CERCLA.
Azrael and Western Processing support giving states protection
when they non-negligently clean up a contaminated site.8 0 Azrael
and Western Processing also affirm state liability when the state was
grossly negligent in its activities. 8 1 Aerojet, Azrael, and Western Processing reinforce CERCLA's broad legislative objectives but remind us
82
that statutes have not only ends but also limits.
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Narrative Analysis
In Stilloe 118,3 the District Court for the Northern District of
New York examined the issue of whether a state agency could be
considered an "operator" for purposes of CERCLA liability when its
only connection to a hazardous waste site resulted from its remedial
clean-up efforts during an emergency.8 4 In its first decision in 1989
(Stilloe 1), the court relied on CPC International,Inc. v. Aerojet-General
Corp.8 5 to hold that DEC was an operator of the site at the time it
78. Western Processing,761 F. Supp. at 729. Furthermore, "Section 107(d),
concerning liability for negligence, is not an authorization for litigation against the
United States, but merely clarifies Congress' intent that the CERCLA remedial
scheme not be viewed as occupying the field to the exclusion of tort claims." Western Processing,761 F. Supp. at 729.
79. Western Processing,761 F. Supp. at 731. It follows that the EPA's regulatory
activities did not render it subject to action for contribution. Id.
80. Memorandum of Law for Defendant State of New York at 3, Stilloe v.
Almy Brothers, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. N.Y. 1991) (No. 90-CV-818).
81. For discussion of the gross negligence exception, see supra notes 52 and
accompanying text.
82. United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 870 (citing Edward
Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1988). For
discussion on limits to state liability, see supranotes 52-55 and accompanying text.
83. 782 F. Supp. 731.
84. Id.
85. 731 F. Supp. at 788.
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broke open the barrels containing the hazardous waste.8 6 However,
when resolving the DEC's motion for reconsideration, the Stilloe HI
court de-emphasized the Aerojet case because of the factual dissimilarities.8 7 The court found that DEC's activities were sufficiently different from those of the MDNR in Aerojet to render that decision
inapposite. 8 Unlike DEC in Stilloe IT, the MDNR had a contractual
relationship with the owner of the property which established a
nexus between the two parties.8 9 Furthermore, there were no allegations that DEC took control of the site for reasons other than
performance of its statutory responsibility to clean up the site. 90
The court asserted that Aerojet did not support the allegation that
DEC was an operator within the meaning of CERCLA. 9 1
Instead, the court looked to two other district court cases to
support its analysis:9 2 United States v. AzraeP3 and United States v.
Western Processing Co., Inc..94 In Azrae4 the court held that when a
state's only connection to the site is its performance of clean-up
activities, the state is exempt from liability. 95 These exemptions
demonstrate that Congress did not intend to subject states and the
federal government to liability under section 107 for their actions
96
during cleanups.
86. Stilloe II, 782 F. Supp. 731 (citing Stilloe I, 759 F. Supp. at 103-04).
87. Stilloe II, 782 F. Supp. at 733.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Stilloe 11, 782 F. Supp. at 733.
92. See id. at 733-35. The district court realized it was not bound by the holding in Azrael or Western Processingbut found factual similarities between the two
cases and the reasoning persuasive, especially in light of their thorough discussion
of the legislative framework and purposes of CERCLA. Id.
93. 765 F. Supp. 1239. For a discussion of Azrael; see supra notes 69-75. The
Stilloe II court discussed Azrael as follows:
[F]inally, the court held that to include the Government or a state within
the scope of section 107 when its only connection to the site is its performance of its clean-up activities would be inconsistent with Congress'
intent to address complaints such as these counter-claims as defenses to a
cost recovery action under section 107(d)... [The court stated that]
[s]ection 107(d) (2) expressly exempts all states and local governments
from CERCLA liability resulting from actions taken in response to an
emergency created by a threatened or actual release from a hazardous
waste site owned by another. Thus, the court concluded that these exemptions demonstrated Congress' intent not to subject states to liability
under section 107 for their actions during clean-up.
Stilloe II, 782 F. Supp. at 734-35 (citing Azrael 765 F. Supp. at 1246).
94. 761 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
95. Azrae4 765 F. Supp. at 1246. The court underscored the express exemption afforded to all states under 107(d) (2). Id. (emphasis added).
96. One court commented in its opinion that:
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9 7 is factually similar to Stilloa98
Like Azrael Western Processing
Unlike Stilloe, however, Western Processinginvolved EPA.9 EPA's predicament was akin to that of DEG in Stilloe II. Both EPA and DEC
were accused of being negligent during the cleanup of the contaminated sites. Notwithstanding, the Western Processing court found
that:

EPA's regulatory activities do not render it an owner/operator under CERCLA. The impropriety and illogic of
construing the statute to contemplate that the negligence
or misfeasance of the EPA would cast it as a potentially
liable owner, operator, transporter, or generator has already been discussed. The EPA was not acting in any of
those capacities as it carried out its regulatory functions,
and it requires contorted reasoning to conclude
otherwise. 0 0
Applying the Western Processing analysis, the Stilloe H court
reached the same conclusion. The court opined that DEC does not
raise its status to that of "operator" when acting solely in a statutory
capacity to clean up contaminated sites. 1 1 Neither Stilloe nor
Almy Brothers alleged that DEC had other objectives. 10 2 DEC took
over management of the property pursuant to its statutory duty to
clean up the hazardous waste site.' 0 3 Although, DEC's "manage[M]any courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have recognized that states
and the Government enjoy special protections when engaged in regulatory activities under CERCLA. In New York v. Johnstown, 701 F. Supp. 33
(N.D.N.Y. 1988) defendants asserted a counter-claim against the State of
New York arising from the state's attempts to remediate a hazardous
waste problem. The court declined to find that the state was one who
"arranged" for the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances under
Section 107(a) (3) because the state had no nexus to the site other than
its cleanup efforts.
Azrae; 765 F. Supp. at 1244 (citingJohnstown, 701 F.Supp. at 36). See also United
States v. Dart Industries, 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988) (refusing to find state
environmental agency to be "owner or operator" under CERCLA by allowing use
of site for disposal of hazardous waste).
97. 761 F. Supp. 725.
98. For a discussion of allegations made against EPA in Western Processing,see
supra notes 76-9 and accompanying text.
99. In Stilloe lthe court emphasized that although Western Processinginvolved
the EPA, rather than a state environmental agency, its reasoning was applicable.
Stilloe II, 782 F. Supp. at 735.
100. Western Processing 761 F. Supp. at 731.
101. Stilloe 1, 782 F. Supp. at 736. See also, Western Processing,761 F. Supp. at
730-31.
102. Stiloe II, 782 F. Supp. at 736.
103. Id.
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ment" of the site resembled the degree of control necessary to create a nexus, DEC did not actually have a sufficient nexus to the site
because it only engaged in those activities for the purpose of remedial cleanup. 10 4 Therefore, the court held DEC could not qualify as
10 5
an "operator" according to CERCLA.
B.

Critical Analysis

Stilloe HT clarified state liability in emergency clean-up situations, but failed to fully define when a state can be held liable as an
operator. Unlike the DEC in Stilloe II, the MDNR in Aerojet engaged
in a "hands on" activity resulting from a contractual legal obligation
to operate purge wells at the site. 10 6 In StilloeII, however, the DEC's
activities did not arise out of a contractual obligation, but were
purely remedial and were undertaken after operation, delivery,
and/or active disposal of the hazardous substances by the defend07
ants had ceased.
Although Aerojet is factually distinguishable from Stilloe H2, the
district court failed to appreciate the guidance offered in the Aerojet
decision. 0 8 Aerojet illustrates some activities that would support a
finding that the state agency had a sufficient nexus, thus qualifying
it as an operator. 10 9 Aerojet provides a direction in determining the
degree of control necessary before the label of "operator" may attach. Aerojet's discussion is valuable because it offers more instruction than any of the prior cases." 0
A closer examination of legislative history, congressional intent, and public policy under which CERCLA was created will eliminate some of the difficulty in interpreting how states fall under the
liability scheme of section 107(d) (2)."' In responding to emergency situations, the state's role in cleaning up hazardous waste is
germane to understanding the policy against holding states lia104. Id. For a discussion of state control and sufficiency of nexus relationship, see supra notes 42-48.
105. Id.
106. Memorandum of Law for Defendant State of New York at 12, Stilloe v.
Almy Brothers, Inc. 759 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. N.Y. 1991) (No. 90-CV-818).
107. Id.
108. For a discussion of the Aerojet holding, see supra notes 66-68.
109. Id.
110. For a discussion of Aerojet, see supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
111. For statutory language of CERCLA § 107(d) (2), see supra note 52 and
accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994

17

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 10

566

VILLANOVA ENVmONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL

[Vol. V. p. 549

ble. 112 The Stilloe II court added clarity in regard to emergency responses by emphasizing the gross negligence exception.11 3
In enacting CERCLA, Congress realized the demand for increased state and public involvement. 1 4 Congress intended that
the public, the states, EPA and the PRPs, have significant roles in
the implementation of CERCLA)' 5 Hence, the type of activity undertaken in Stilloe //by the DEC is one contemplated role. While
the Stilloe 11 court explained that DEC's activities did not amount to
a sufficient nexus, it failed to identify what involvement would be
sufficient. Under the facts presented in Stilloe II, the court was unable to precisely define what creates a sufficient nexus between the
PRP and the site.116 The court merely confirmed that a release resulting from an emergency cleanup was not the type of activity that
subjects a state agency to liability. The Stilloe H court does not adequately explain and explore the policy background of why states are
not to be found liable when they are responding to emergency
clean-up situations.
The history behind CERCLA "suggests that Congress was concerned about cooperative federalism - balancing the state and federal roles in dealing with the hazardous waste problem.""' 7
Apparently, Congress not only wanted the states to become actively
involved in cleanup of hazardous waste sites, but also understood
112. For statutory language of CERCLA § 107(d)(2), see supra note 52 and
accompanying text. The Stilloe 1"court emphasized Congress's intent not to hold
states liable when they are responding to emergency clean-up situations.
113. The court emphasized CERCLA section 107(d) (2), which relieves states
and local governments from liability when they are responding to emergency situations. Stilloe 1, 782 F. Supp. at 736. See CERCLA § 107(d) (2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(d) (2).
114. 2 S.Cooke, The Law of Hazardous Waste § 12.0417] [el at 12-93.
Congress took a number of steps in SARA to facilitate increased public and state participation. First, it added new CERCLA Section 117,
which requires the EPA to make early disclosure of its proposed remedial
action plans, to solicit public input, and to explain arty changes in the
response action. Technical assistance grants were authorized to facilitate
more meaningful public participation in the remedy selection process.
Second, Congress added a new provision authorizing citizen suits to enjoin violations of CERCLA requirements or to compel the EPA to do its
job, and expressly authorized intervention by persons significantly affected by the issues in CERCIA litigation. Finally, Congress gave the
states a major role in the remedy selection process under Section 121.
Id. at 12-93 - 12-94.
115. See Cooke, supra note 114, at 12-94.
116. The Stilloe II court decided that DEC's response to an emergency cleanup did not amount to the type of involvement meant to be covered by CERCLA;
thus, there was an insufficient nexus. See generally Stilloe I1,782 F. Supp. 731.
117. Cooke, supra note 114, § 12.03(4] [g] at 12-37.
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that "the task was too large to be borne solely by the federal
government." 118
Congress desired that the states and EPA act as partners in
their clean-up efforts. 119 Moreover, Congress intended CERCLA to
furnish a "basic federal cleanup program, while leaving [the] states
free to implement their own more ambitious or complementary
programs ... .-"120 This decision furthers these goals by encouraging
expeditious cleanups in emergency situations.
In conclusion, the district court did not suggest that Stilloe was
without a remedy or that a state agency may never qualify as an
"operator" for purposes of CERCLA.12 On the contrary, the Stilloe
court merely found no CEROLA claims available to the plaintiffs,
but underscored the possibility of a state tort claim.' 22 The clarification forwarded in Stilloe 1eliminates the potential for using CERCLA as a vehicle to lump all environmental clean-up claims
together by suggesting the possibility that alternate and more appropriate remedies are available.
V.

IMPACT

From the outset, trying to refine and interprete CERCLA has
been an ambitious endeavor because of the statute's poorly drafted
provisions.' 23 Nevertheless, Stilloe v. Almy Brothers, Inc. furnishes another piece of the puzzle. Although it is almost impossible for a
state agency to discern what degree of involvement in an activity will
result in its being labeled as an "operator," 2 4 it can be assured that
it will ordinarily not be held liable for a release occurring during an
25
emergency cleanup.'
118. Id. An example of how Congress wanted the states to become actively
involved in cleanup is that "CERCLA mandates that federal authorities consult
with the states before taking any remedial action, and authorizes reimbursement
of state response costs by the Fund." Id. at 12-37 - 12-38 (footnotes omitted).
119. Id. at 12-38.
120. Id.
121. Stilloe II, 782 F.Supp. at 736.
122. Id. In its opinion, the Stiloe II court highlighted that Stilloe as well as
Almy Brothers may very well have claims against DEC, but they are not CERCLA
claims. Id. "Rather, any claims that they might have against DEC for its handling
of the clean-up effort are state law tort claims which section 107(d) (2) specifically
does not preclude." Id.
123. For a discussion of the inherent ambiguity of CERCLA, see supra notes
35-40.
124. For the CERCLA definition of "operator," see text accompanying supra
note 35.
125. For statutory language of CERCLA section 107(d) (2), see supra note 52.
It is only when the state agency responds negligently that it will be liable. See CERCIA § 107(d) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d) (2).
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The Stilloe II decision 126 illustrates a positive use of the obscure
directives in CERCLA as construed by other courts.1 27 Stilloe II
helps to clear up the ambiguity inherent in CERCLA and may inspire other courts to work towards accomplishing Congress's intent.128 In defining boundaries of liability, the legislative purpose
of prompt cleanups will be facilitated. As evidenced in Stilloe II,
state environmental agencies can carry out their statutory clean-up
29
obligations without the fear of repercussions under CERCLA.'
Stilloe Ilproperly places clean-up costs on the polluter not the entity
trying to remedy the hazardous situation.
Courts have yet to identify which activities create a sufficient
nexus that would result in an agency being labeled an operator. 30
It may be impractical to attempt to enumerate all the possible activities, but more directives would enable the a state agency to ascertain when the role of "operator" has been undertaken. CERCLA's
aim is to have responsible parties pay for the harm they caused to
the environment, not to punish those who are trying to restore it.
Stilloe II upholds the true intent of CERCLA without sacrificing its
purpose.
Michelle M. Delgado
126. For a discussion of the Stilloe I/holding, see supranote 7 and accompanying text.
127. For discussion of how CERCLA § 107 has been applied by courts, see
supra notes 56-82.
128. For discussion of Congressional intent underlying CERCLA, see supra
notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 52. CERGLA section 107(d) (2) protects the states when
they are responding to an emergency. CERCLA § 107(d)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(d) (2).
130. Perhaps the Stilloe II court's reinforcement that an emergency clean-up
does not amount to a sufficient nexus will pave the way for other courts to expand
on what does create a nexus.
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